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WHAT IS THIS CASE DOING HERE?
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Steven M. Schneebaum
I.
In March 2001, I was a member of a team of lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in a case called Doe v. Lumintang before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.1 We put on evidence that an Indonesian major general, Johny Lumintang, had given direct orders in 1999, as
the Indonesian military withdrew from the country now called Timor-Leste
(East Timor), for the brutal massacre of civilians.2 The defendant was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and in later years rose to the rank of lieutenant general.3 We argued that he was civilly liable, under the doctrine of
command responsibility, for the torture and killing of eight individuals who
were our clients or our clients’ decedents.4 Jurisdiction was invoked under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, enacted in 1789, under
which the federal courts may hear tort cases brought by non-U.S. citizens
alleging violations of international law.5
Most of our clients had never been off their home island before.
They were illiterate and, by the time they arrived in Washington for trial, in
deep culture shock. Their testimony was mostly given in Tetum, a language



B.A. Yale, M.A. Oberlin, B.A. and M.A. Oxford, M.C.L. (A.P.) George Washington
University. Mr. Schneebaum is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Fox Rothschild,
LLP, and has just begun his 22nd year as Professorial Lecturer in international and constitutional law at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.
1
Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2001), appeal dismissed, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13962, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The district court’s decisions—the two in the
plaintiffs’ favor by Magistrate Judge Kay and the ultimate dismissal by Judge Kessler—are
unreported.
2
See Lumintang, No. 00-674, slip. op. at 29 (“It has been established by the default
judgment and by testimony at trial that Lumintang had responsibility for the actions against
plaintiffs and a larger pattern of gross human rights violations.”).
3
Id. at 4, 7.
4
Id. at 6, 30.
5
Id. at 1; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2011); see also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., 14A FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3661.1 (3d ed. 2011)
(“There is also federal court jurisdiction under Section 1350 of Title 28, which has its roots
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.”).

183

File: Schneebaum 2

Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM

184

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:183

spoken by fewer than half a million people around the world. 6 The key documents, written in Bahasa Indonesia, were unintelligible in their original
form to anyone in the courtroom.
Magistrate Judge Alan Kay listened as witnesses testified about
East Timor’s decades of struggle for independence from Indonesia. We produced aerial photographs, and had an expert explain the devastation that he
could read in those pictures: something like 75% of the man-made structures on the island were destroyed as the Indonesian forces decamped,
knowing that they could no longer govern what they considered a province
of their country, but determined to leave behind such ruin and misery that
no one else would be able—or would want—to do so either.7
We heard a mother testify about her futile efforts to keep her young
son from fleeing their village to join pro-independence militias in the jungle. “All who stay in the village will be killed,” explained the young man.
His mother replied, “It does not matter. At least we will all die together.” He
left; she never saw him alive again. The testimony of this woman, barely
four feet nine inches tall and terrified, like the eerie silence as she and then
the interpreter spoke, was searing and unforgettable.
The other side of the courtroom was empty. Neither General Lumintang, who had been personally served with process at Washington Dulles International Airport while on a visit to the United States, nor the Government or Embassy of Indonesia, had entered an appearance in the litigation.
In the end, Judge Kay authored a denunciation both passionate and
scholarly of the defendant’s violation of numerous norms of international
law, finding him liable for $66 million in damages.8 At that stage, and in
light of the limited but devastating press coverage of the decision, the Indonesian Embassy filed a petition for leave to answer the complaint, which
was granted, followed by a motion to dismiss, which was denied.9 The Embassy then, on behalf of General Lumintang, appealed from the judgment of
the Magistrate Judge to District Judge Gladys Kessler, who reversed, albeit
6

See Paul M. Lewis, Tetun, ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD, http://www.ethno
logue.com/show_language.asp?code=tet (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (Tetum is also known as
Tetun, Tetung, and Belo, among others).
7
See World: Asia-Pacific UN Wants $200m for East Timor, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/487181.stm (“The UN said that the scope of devastation in the territory was extraordinary, with 75% of its people displaced and 70% of the
buildings destroyed in looting and attacks set off by the 30 August independence referendum.”).
8
Lumintang, No. 00-674, slip. op. at 42–43.
9
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and
Order and Judgment on Damages at 36–37, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.D.C. filed
March 25, 2002); Report and Recommendation at 24, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674
(D.D.C. filed March 3, 2004).
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with open and declared reluctance: service of process had been affected
outside of the District of Columbia, and was therefore invalid.10 The case
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.11 Given
the wording of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
territorial constraints on proper service, there was little basis for appeal.12
The case against Johny Lumintang was by no means my first foray
into ATS litigation. I was counsel for three nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) as amici curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), and sat at counsel table in New York City as Peter Weiss delivered
the historic and powerful argument that led to the landmark Second Circuit
decision.13 I have appeared as counsel or have represented amici in numerous cases since then, have authored over a dozen law review articles, and
have given countless speeches on this topic.
In this Symposium on “International Law in Crisis,” and as part of
the panel tasked with discussing “International Law in U.S. Courts,” however, I want to raise a question that has not been widely discussed among
human rights advocates (although it is frequently raised by our critics): is it
sensible, and is it right, for a court in Washington, D.C., established under
the United States Constitution and operating under laws enacted by the
United States Congress, to use its limited time and resources to hear a case
like Doe v. Lumintang? There is, after all, an undeniable backlash against
the hearing of such cases. What do we say to a federal judge who asks,
plaintively, “What is this case doing here?”
II.
If this question is understood simply as a legal one—i.e., is it proper
as a matter of law for a U.S. court to exercise subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction in a case like this?—then the answer is easy. No less than the
United States Supreme Court, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain14—over the vehement protests of the Bush Administration then in power—unsurprisingly
10
Memorandum Setting Forth Objections of Defendant to the Report and Recommendation Issued by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay from Defendant Major General Johny Lumintang,
Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir. filed March 23, 2004); Memorandum Opinion,
Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2004).
11
Judge Kessler noted that she was “constrained” to reach this result, and did so “with
great regret.” Memorandum Opinion at 1–2, 13, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir.
filed Nov. 10, 2004).
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (establishing personal jurisdiction over defendant if he is not
subject to jurisdiction in any other state’s court of general jurisdiction).
13
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that jurisdiction is
proper under the ATS when an alleged torturer is served with process by another alien within
U.S. borders).
14
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
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concluded that the venerable ATS says what it means and means what it
says. That is, the district courts do have subject-matter jurisdiction over any
suit, brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”15 The law of nations today includes norms of the international law of human rights. If personal jurisdiction can be obtained over a prospective defendant accused of violating those
norms, there is no reason why such a suit cannot go forward.
Justice David Souter, speaking for the Court in Sosa, made clear
that not just any alleged violation of international law—or even of fundamental human rights—will sustain the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts under the ATS.16 To prevail, an ATS plaintiff must allege, in
a manner capable of surviving the standard challenges against vague, conclusory, or inadequately pleaded complaints,17 and ultimately must show
that the rule claimed to have been violated by the defendant was “specific,
universal, and obligatory.”18 And, of course, as my team was reminded in
Lumintang, like any civil plaintiff, an ATS claimant must properly obtain
personal jurisdiction, must serve process within the rules, and must observe
other procedural constraints, such as applicable statutes of limitations.
Moreover, other defenses normally available to civil defendants in
cases spanning borders may be deployed here. In appropriate circumstances,
for instance, a defendant may look for protection behind the doctrines of act
of state,19 forum non conveniens,20 or political question (equitable abstention).21 Or, he or she may claim entitlement to sovereign immunity under
federal statute22 or, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar v.

15

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (“It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less
than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arrangement, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.”).
17
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”)
(quoting Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
18
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a
norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
19
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (explaining
the origin and nature of the act of state doctrine).
20
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 251, 263 (1981) (discussing the rationale behind forum non conveniens).
21
See, e.g., Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 559 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he purpose of the
political question doctrine is to bar claims that have the potential to undermine the separation-of-powers design of our federal government.”).
22
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
16
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Yusuf,23 in appropriate circumstances according to a suggestion to that effect
by the Department of State.24
However high the barriers to permission to proceed may be, certain
principles of the law of nations have been deemed by the courts to be “specific, universal, and obligatory,” and thus to permit federal jurisdiction over
well-pleaded charges that their violation by named and served defendants
have injured identifiable plaintiffs.25 From a legal perspective, then, there is
no reason for the courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in these cases,
which arise within the four corners of a statute that has been on the books
very nearly as long as the United States has been an independent country.
When federal law establishes a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction,
it is exceptional for courts to decline to exercise that jurisdiction because of
foreign policy considerations. Our courts have long accepted in principle the
notion—in the famous words of Mr. Justice Grey in The Paquete Habana26—that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”27 Nor was that concept novel even at the threshold of the twentieth
century: it may be found in the self-imposed obligation recorded by Thomas
Jefferson in the Declaration of our Independence, not only to explain the
colonists’ revolutionary intentions to demonstrate a “decent respect to the
opinions of mankind,” but also to insist that the new Republic take its place
as a coequal member of the community of sovereign nations.28
There are, of course, exceptional situations in which adjudication of
a dispute before a court might actually damage the ability of the executive
branch to conduct the foreign policy of the United States without interference from the judiciary.29 But few are the ATS lawsuits in which the federal
government has urged the courts to reject claims, or to abstain from hearing
them, because of such concerns.30 ATS cases, after all, usually involve alle23

Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.Ct. 2278 (2010) (holding that FSIA immunity does not apply
to foreign officials sued in their individual capacity).
24
See id.
25
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d
at 1475).
26
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
27
Id. at 700.
28
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
29
The Supreme Court has held that only in very limited circumstances may a court decline
to adjudicate a case because it raises “political questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). While foreign affairs powers are generally granted to the Executive under the Constitution, Justice Brennan for the Court admonished that “it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Id. at 211.
30
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (referencing the “neverending tension” between judicial and political branches in foreign affairs).

File: Schneebaum 2

Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM

188

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:183

gations that a particular individual, in the course of carrying out a public
commission, violated the victims’ fundamental human rights, by ignoring a
jus cogens norm such as the one forbidding torture. It is rarely in the interests of the United States to align itself with someone credibly accused of
such conduct, in seeking to immunize him against individual liability.
And since the Supreme Court opined on the meaning of the ATS in
Sosa for the first time in the more than two centuries the statute has been on
the books, the lower courts have continued to declare certain ATS cases to
be well within the four corners of the law. Thus, for example, a district court
found jurisdiction in a case alleging that a program to eradicate cocaine
planting in Colombia might have entailed the liability of a U.S.-based contractor for violating the law of nations.31 Nigerian children were permitted
to proceed in an action alleging that a drug company experimented on them
without their knowledge or permission.32 And a court in Miami ordered a
former Honduran military intelligence chief to pay $47 million in damages
to six survivors of torture, and to the families of individuals forcibly “disappeared” under his command.33
The statute is again before the Supreme Court during its current
term, for a determination of whether and when corporations or other private
actors, acting in partnership with public bodies, may be liable either for
committing human rights abuses or for aiding and abetting abuses perpetrated by their joint venture partners.34 But the efforts of those who would declare all of international law to be non-normative, to be nothing more than
aspirational if that, have—for the moment at least—failed.

31

See Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that Ecuadorian
residents had a claim against a U.S. contractor under the ATS).
32
Abdullahi v. Pfizer Corp., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the prohibition on
nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings was a universally accepted norm
of customary international law, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the ATS), cert.
denied, 130 S.Ct. 3541 (2010).
33
See Reyes v. Grijalba, Case No. 02-22046 (S.D. Fla. 2007). For in-depth analysis of this
and numerous other post-Sosa cases in which it represented the plaintiffs, see the website of
the Center for Justice and Accountability, www.cja.org. I have served for several years on
the Legal Advisory Council of CJA.
34
This question has been answered affirmatively in a number of district and circuit court
decisions. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit became the only
federal circuit to reject the principle that a corporation can be liable under the ATS for violating the law of nations. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010),
reh’g en banc denied, 621 F.3d 111 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). Contra
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (permitting a plaintiff in an
ATS case to pursue a corporate defendant on an “aiding and abetting” theory), reh’g denied,
343 Fed. Appx. 600 (2009); Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (2011) (“The factual
premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.”). For an update to Kiobel,
see infra note 85.
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As a matter of law, therefore, it was perfectly proper for Magistrate
Judge Kay to hear and to decide the Lumintang matter. And it must—if
grudgingly—be conceded that it was perfectly proper for Judge Kessler
thereafter to apply standard rules pertinent to civil cases in general, and to
decide on that basis that an irremediable error in service of process and establishing personal jurisdiction doomed the case. Those premises mandated
reversal of its outcome.
That something happens to be consistent with a strict application of
legal principles, however, does not necessarily mean that it is sensible. It
certainly does not mean that it is right. Honest inquiry requires that we continue to pursue those questions.
III.
If I am correct so far, and there is no strictly legal impediment to
U.S. courts hearing human rights cases arising overseas so long as the defendant can be found and the well-pleaded allegation against him or her
involves a suitably clear prohibition, the remaining issue is whether this is a
rational result. This question is not, of course, one for judges to resolve, in
our system of separation of powers. It is up to the political branches to propose or to enact a change to the statute if, as written, it is incoherent, wasteful, or counterproductive.
I want to explore three kinds of arguments urging that cases like
Lumintang should no longer be permitted to play out before the American
judiciary. These three arguments rely on assertions of (A) imperialism, (B)
indeterminacy, and (C) inefficiency. Each suggests that the practice of presenting allegations of human rights abuses to U.S. judges is fundamentally
flawed and should be abandoned.
A.

Imperialism

The argument regarding imperialism is simply stated. It contends
that the U.S. has no right—indeed, that no country has the right—to impose
its legal system, or its legal sensibilities, on any other nation without its
consent. Imperialism is commonly defined, after all, as the domination by
one nation of another against the will of the latter, forcing it to subordinate
itself to the dominant power’s economic, cultural, and/or political values.35
A stronger form of the argument objects to any extraterritorial reach
of domestic legal rules.36 A weaker form reserves its opposition to the ex35

Peter Hatton, Imperialism, in DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 121–22
(Michael A. Riff ed., 1987).
36
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010) (holding that the
presumption that federal law is not meant to have extraterritorial effect is applicable in all
cases, whenever a party seeks to give any federal legislation extraterritorial effect); George
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tension of jurisdiction over disputes that do not directly implicate the interests of the forum state, according to whatever delineation of the outer limits
of those interests is generally accepted at the time by the community of nations.37
Both versions of the argument, contending that U.S. human rights
jurisprudence is a form of cultural imperialism, ignore legal and practical
principles that have been established for centuries. Both also take a view of
international law itself that is impossible to reconcile with most people’s
understanding of this country’s role in the world, and the world’s role in this
country.
International law has never—despite what seem to be prevalent
public perceptions to the contrary—required that the reach of a domestic
legal system stop “at the water’s edge.”38 The Permanent Court of International Justice (the League of Nations predecessor to the current International
Court of Justice in The Hague) made clear that the international legal system prohibits a state from causing its laws to impinge on the legitimate sovereign interests of others, but so long as that pitfall is avoided, what is not
forbidden is permitted.39 Nor is this principle some narrow legal precedent
of restricted applicability. International commercial law and practice (the
ancient “Lex Mercatoria”)40 have acknowledged for centuries the need for a
uniform system of legal rules transcending national boundaries.41
In the civil law context, it has long been internationally accepted
that courts of one state may, and regularly do, apply the laws of another in
adjudicating disputes properly before them, so long as the defendant and the

P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 580, 582 (2004) (arguing that
universal jurisdiction will lead to the fundamental injustice of double jeopardy).
37
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the
Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245 (2004) (arguing that a broad interpretation of ATS
will make federal courts instruments of judicial imperialism and damage international relations).
38
See generally David Solan, In the Wake of Citizens United, Do Foreign Politics Still
Stop at the Water's Edge?, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 312 (2010) (exploring the impact
of foreign influences in the U.S. legal system in the wake of Citizens United); Stephen J.
Wayne, The Multiple Influences on U.S. Foreign Policy-Making, 5 U.S. FOREIGN POL’Y
AGENDA 25, 27 (2000) (“The distinction between foreign and domestic as well as the one
between national and international has become blurred. As a consequence, the pressure and
players have multiplied as has the politics.”).
39
See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (reasoning that,
without an express prohibition, sovereign states may behave as they wish).
40
Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 221, 274–77 (1978) (analyzing the role of
international custom in international commercial law and the codification of Lex Mercatoria).
41
Id. at 221.
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subject matter are within the forum state’s jurisdictional reach. 42 Again,
disputes ranging from the most mundane to the geopolitical are regularly
addressed in this way. No one would advocate limiting the scope of the international commercial regime, or effectively permitting the breacher of a
contract, or the perpetrator of a tort, to evade liability simply by removing
herself to foreign soil.
I am not limiting my reference here to universal jurisdiction, the
theory under which states may use their criminal laws to punish the perpetrators of acts occurring far from their shores even absent any connection to
their nationals, because it is alleged that those acts were, for example, significant violations of basic human rights. To accept my argument that there
is nothing imperialistic about applying one state’s law in the courtrooms of
another does not require offering a warm embrace of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the United States in particular, we reject the concept of
“common law crimes,” insisting on a criminal code enacted through our
constitutional system of legislation, not derived from the statements of international organizations or the contents of unratified treaties, much less the
vagaries of customary international law.43 Here, in other words, international law may motivate Congress to outlaw certain behavior, or to make it
criminal under U.S. law even absent any obvious connection with the
U.S.,44 but international law alone unaided by implementing legislation does
not provide a sufficient basis for prosecution.45
42

Compare Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation:
The Role of Judicial Discretion, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 185 (2004) (claiming that increased cross-border judicial communication will increase transnational litigation),
with Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481 (2011) (arguing that the forum shopping system of the United States no longer encourages foreign plaintiffs to file transnational suits in the United States).
43
The Constitution expressly reserves to Congress the power “To define and punish . . .
Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (finding that robbery upon the sea is piracy by the
law of nations, and that it is constitutionally defined by an act of Congress).
44
Thus, for example, in 2000 Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the
Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), under which Charles “Chuckie” Taylor was then tried,
convicted, and sentenced to prison for horrific crimes committed in Liberia. See generally
Laura Richardson Brownlee, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States: American
Attitudes and Practices in the Prosecution of Charles Chuckie Taylor Jr., 9 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 331 (2010).
45
There are, however, reported cases in which U.S. judges have deferred to foreign states’
invocation of universal jurisdiction to order the deportation of persons accused of crimes
against humanity. One of those was tried and argued right here in Cleveland: Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 518 F.Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff’d, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated,
10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993). The author served as counsel for the International Human Rights
Law Group as amicus curiae in Demjanjuk, and presented oral argument to Chief Judge
Frank Battisti.
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ATS and other human rights cases—civil litigation, in which plaintiffs claiming to be victims bring suit against persons alleged to have been
perpetrators of human rights abuses—do not masquerade as attempts to
vindicate the rights of society as a whole. They do not share the indicia of
criminal prosecutions, in which “the People” or “the State” is the notional
plaintiff. These are private cases, and the assertion of jurisdiction over them
no more threatens the sovereignty of the place where the acts occurred than
does the consideration by an English court of a breach of contract between a
Japanese shipper and a Panamanian ship owner, or by the interpretation of a
Moroccan court of a divorce decree issued in Oklahoma.
To be sure, human rights cases may have in their sights the conduct
or policies of a government. But in some such instances there are traditional
ways for courts to limit themselves in deference to doctrines like act of state
or equitable abstention. There is nothing imperialistic in holding a state official civilly liable for acts committed in contravention of international
commitments solemnly and presumably voluntarily undertaken by the country of her or his nationality. After all, if adherence to a treaty gives rise to
legal obligations, there should be no standing to complain that an individual
who is meant to be the beneficiary of those obligations has the right to have
the facts and law tested by a judge, applying legal norms of specific applicability, when it is alleged that an agent of the state has violated them.
There may be gray areas here, of course: the case in which, for example, a state has signed but not ratified the applicable treaty or has been a
persistent objector to the emergence of a customary norm.46 But these objections will not arise frequently. No state claims the right to torture detainees,
or members of ethnic minorities, or political dissidents. Whether alleged
abuse rose to the level of torture or was an acceptable use of coercion,
whether it happened under the auspices of the state or was conducted by
renegades not affiliated with public authority, or whether this individual
defendant was the person who perpetrated or ordered the abuse or was himself or herself unable to alter it: all of these are subject to resolution in the
normal course of judicial decision-making. They are fact questions, and
judges and juries are paid to resolve such questions. There is no difference,
46
Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International
Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 497–98 (2005).
As one might gather, international norms develop over time; they do not simultaneously emerge and become law. During a norm's gradual emergence, some states
may object to the norm attaining legal status. According to the persistent objector
doctrine, these objectors shall be exempt from the norm after it becomes law, so
long as the state can rebut the assumption that it acquiesced to the norm and prove
that, instead, it exercised clear and consistent objections throughout the norm's
emergence.
Id.
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in principle, between asking a New York court to determine whether a contract for the sale of widgets between a Swiss seller and an American buyer,
written in French and governed by Swiss law, was breached by the defendant’s delivery of sub-standard goods, on the one hand, and asking that same
court to decide whether the policy of ethnic cleansing embraced by the Republika Srpska and orchestrated by its leader, Radovan Karadzic, justifies
holding him civilly liable to women raped by Bosnian Serb troops under his
direction, on the other.47
B.

Indeterminacy

It is sometimes argued that the problem with cases like Doe v. Lumintang is not that a foreign court asserting subject-matter jurisdiction is
being arrogant, but rather that, once such jurisdiction is claimed, identifying
the norms governing the defendant’s liability is an impossible task for domestic judges. The asserted vagueness of international law has been one of
the main contentions underlying legislative and other efforts to preclude its
use in U.S. courts.
None less than Chief Justice John Roberts has written to the effect
that some source of international law can be found to support almost any
proposition.48 When the Supreme Court concluded that the practices of other nations should inform this country’s understanding of whether the execution of juvenile offenders is consistent with due process of law,49 or whether
homosexual acts between consenting adults may be punished as crimes
against the state,50 there were howls of protest, including some coming from
dissenting Justices on the high court itself.51 And this reaction was motivated by precisely the concern that international law is not a fixed body of le47
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) rev’g Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that Bosnian Serb militias bore sufficient resemblance to agents
of a state, and reversed the district court, which had accepted the defendant’s argument that
the Republika Srpska, unrecognized by any disinterested state and certainly not recognized
by the U.S., was therefore not a subject of international law at all).
48
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“In foreign law you can find anything you want. . .
. Looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your
friends. You can find them. They're there.”).
49
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
50
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
51
Justice Antonin Scalia has expressed his views from the Bench, but also from the podium in many public forums, to the effect that foreign and international law has no business
being used as a source of law by U.S. judges, except in cases in when necessary to interpret a
treaty. A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance of Foreign
Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 521 (2005)
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gal norms, but is instead a fluid amalgam of such vague and unreliable
things as scholarly writings that cannot be filtered even to exclude improper
content, open ethnic biases, and outright prejudice against certain states and
their economic, political, or cultural values.52
But despite the protestations of those who consider international
law not to be law at all, and who therefore find only confirmation of that
view in its lack of “black letter” content, there are long-established procedures for distinguishing among lex lata (hard law, generally accepted as
such in the international community), lex ferenda (propositions that may
reflect law in the making, but that do not constitute definitive contents of
international law as it stands today), and what Professor Ralph Steinhardt of
George Washington University calls “lex nada” (aspirational statements that
we all might wish were the law, but that bear none of the indicia even of
being en route to general acceptance).53
Nor is it any kind of self-indulgence for the U.S. judiciary to develop a jurisprudence capable of making these distinctions. After all, in The
Paquete Habana, Mr. Justice Gray’s famous pronouncement was not only
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” but that it “must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”54 In other words, given the canonical interpretation of our Constitution handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison—
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch to say what
the law is”55—and given the premise that “international law is part of our
law,”56 there is nothing at all unusual in the notion that judges have the task
of deciding what international law is as it may be applicable in any given
situation properly before the judicial branch for resolution.
During the oral argument in Sosa, Justice Antonin Scalia—both on
the bench and off a vocal opponent of the relevance of international law to
the constitutional task of American judges—challenged counsel for the re52

See Benjamin Perryman, Eve La Hay’s War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts 36
QUEEN'S L.J. 673, 680 (2008) (“Discerning what amounts to customary international law is at
best an imprecise process.”).
53
Robert Cryer, Superior Scholarship on Superior Orders an Appreciation of Yoram
Dinstein’s The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders’ in International Law, 9 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 959, 972 (2011) (book review). E-mail from Ralph G. Steinhardt, Professor of
Law, George Washington Univ. Law School, to Andrew Dorchak, Head of Reference and
Foreign/International Law Specialist, Case Western Reserve Univ. Law Library (Oct. 12,
2011, 19:54 EST) (on file with Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) (explaining that lex nada was coined as joking contrast to established law to the law in the process of
evolution).
54
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
55
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
56
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
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spondent.57 He said, “[t]he problem I have with your proposal is that it
leaves it up to the courts to decide what the law of nations is.”58 This, apparently, was meant to suggest that there is some fatal flaw in the claim that
human rights law is a corpus juris actually speaking the language of individual legal rights and individual legal obligations.
Yet that “problem” has never deterred the U.S. judiciary from doing
its job. In Filartiga, and in every ATS case since, courts have had to decide
whether torture,59 extrajudicial killings,60 arbitrary detention (as in Sosa
itself),61 transborder kidnapping (as in the first visit of the Sosa case to the
Supreme Court thirteen years earlier),62 or other alleged international human
rights abuses are sufficient to constitute acts contrary to the law of nations.63
Overall, the courts have been—as they usually are—moderate and
incremental in their approach to defining the law of human rights.64 With
the additional guidance provided by the decision in Sosa, they have continued on this path. Yes, determining the content of international law is not
always easy. Yes, there is no statute book and there are no legislative pronouncements to consult, and no texts that all agree are definitive, even if
occasionally opaque. Yes, there are instances in which competing parties
are able to deploy competing authorities before the court, advocating competing outcomes, and yes, in some instances the authorities themselves may
be in agreement about very little.
But common law judges are familiar with the task of deriving legal
principles from stuff far murkier than printed compilations contained in
codes. There is no end of authoritative guidance. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, for example, outlines the three primary sources of
international law (treaties, custom, and “general principles of law recog-

57

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739–51 (2004).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
(No. 03-339), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_trans
cripts/03-339.pdf; Steven M. Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law
in U.S. Courts After Sosa, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 91, 94 (2005).
59
E.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
60
E.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
61
See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
62
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (“The fact of respondent's
forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for
violations of the criminal laws of the United States.”).
63
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
64
Jennifer Levine, Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation: Adjudicating on “Foreign Territory,”
30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 101, 101–15 (detailing the progress of U.S. courts defining
the law of human rights).
58

File: Schneebaum 2

Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM

196

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:183

nized by civilized nations”),65 and provides that the writings of jurists and
scholars may be of service as a subsidiary source.66 Identifying the sources
of international law is not an exercise in charting a course through chaos.
In recent years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
had to determine the content and the applicability of international law in a
number of cases. They have not shied from the task. They have considered
whether, and to what extent, detainees at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to
rights referenced in treaties signed by the United States, such as the Geneva
Conventions.67 They have been required to consider whether an individual
may bring a claim against the U.S. Government for allegedly transferring
him to the custody of a third state for interrogation that might have included
torture.68
In short, confronting the alleged indeterminacy of the law—the difficulty of finding it, interpreting it, and applying it to cases at hand—comes
with the job of judging. That the law may be elusive and difficult to identify
provides no justification for judges who may prefer to decline to play the
roles assigned to them by a constitutional structure.
C.

Inefficiency

It is not arrogant for U.S. courts to hear cases alleging human rights
violations in foreign countries. Nor does the difficulty in mapping the contours of the applicable law provide a rational basis for declining to decide
hard cases.
But judicial resources are finite, and judges all over the world are
notoriously overworked and underpaid. Why should Magistrate Judge Kay,
or District Judge Kessler, have been required to put aside a full docket of
local criminal and civil disputes to hear about something that allegedly happened on the other side of the planet, among foreigners who had no discernible connection with the United States?
This is a difficult question to answer. But it invites another question, which as a long-time trial lawyer I have often contemplated: why
should the public authorities of our Government ever involve themselves in
deciding the proper outcome of a dispute between private individuals? Why
should eight citizens of Prince George’s County, Maryland, for example,
paid with public funds, have been asked to sit as a jury to decide whether
my client Vincent P. Mona or his son Mark Mona was telling the truth in

65

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945.
Id.
67
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562–64 (2006) (considering the application of the Geneva Conventions to the detainees at Guantanamo).
68
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
66
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their inconsistent renditions of the foundation, governance, and board decisions of Mona Electric Group, Inc., a private corporation?69
The answer, I believe, reflects a fundamental commitment of our
society, and a fundamental role that we want the law and the courts to play
in that society. The entire regime of civil (as opposed to criminal) jurisprudence is grounded in the idea that the enforcement of obligations owed by
private citizens to one another is a legitimate matter of public cognizance.70
Courts thus exist not only to defend the rights of society as a collectivity: that is, public order, whose protection is the province of the criminal
law. They are tasked with determining and enforcing private rights as well.
Those rights may derive from many sources, including private agreements
(i.e., contracts) between consenting individual participants often entered
with no outside oversight at all. A contract that you and I form is a private
legal regime, governing our conduct vis-à-vis each other, and subject to
regulation by the public authorities should either of us contend that the other
has acted inconsistently with his or her undertaking. To be sure, there are
rules and procedures that must be observed by the party invoking judicial
remedies. But if those rules are satisfied, then the state will dedicate its own
resources, both human and financial, to helping us to resolve our dispute.
The state does have an interest in the outcome, because predictability, certainty, fairness, and stability are values that the state regards as beneficial
for the entire polity.71
Beyond this system of consensual private law—private regimes that
delineate the rights we individual citizens agree to create and to recognize—
the state also defines the duties and responsibilities that we all have with
respect to each other even absent any agreement. If you have a license from
the public authorities to operate a motor vehicle, you are under an obligation
to the state to do so in a manner approved by and consistent with a code of
laws.72 If you drive too fast, or cross a double yellow line, the authorities
may determine that you are posing a threat to public order, triggering the
coercive power of the state itself to be deployed against you. You may be
required to pay a fine, or to refrain from exercising the privilege of driving
69
Mona v. Mona Electric Group, Inc., 934 A.2d 450 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). I have
selected this example from litigation in which I have been personally involved over the
course of a career in the private practice of civil law.
70
The state’s commitment to use public resources to resolve civil disputes is guaranteed in
the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (giving courts jurisdiction to resolve civil
disputes as well as criminal disputes); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (promising trial by jury in
civil cases with more the twenty dollars in controversy).
71
E.W. Thomas, Fairness and Certainty in Adjudication: Formalism v Substantialism, 9
OTAGO L. REV. 459, 464–65 (1999) (discussing the peoples’ need for fairness and predictability in order to prepare their affairs in advance).
72
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511 (West 2011) (outlining the responsibilities,
offenses and penalties for violating traffic laws).
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for a defined period of time. If the offense is serious enough, you may even
be deprived of your liberty.
But in addition to the obligations you owe to the state, and the right
that the state may have to enforce those duties, you also owe something of a
different nature to me: the guy crossing with the light and in the crosswalk
(or driving in my own car just ahead of you, or just behind you). You owe
me what the law of torts has come to call a “duty of care,”73 and if you
breach that duty to me and cause injury as a result, I may invoke the public
authority of the law to seek a private remedy from you.74 Your liability for
that remedy is analytically quite separate from your guilt or innocence of
charges that you have violated your obligations to the state.
My point in this meander through basic legal principles is simply to
show something we all already know: that the civil law provides powerful
and vital mechanisms for the protection of rights private individuals have
against one another, despite the absence of any claim on the part of the state
that public rights have been affected.
Adjudicating such matters, however, is always going to involve a
substantial helping of inefficiency, for several reasons. First, given that the
state itself is not a party to the dispute resolution procedure, the framing of
issues and the presentation of evidence are going to require not only careful
scrutiny of the kind that emerges naturally from robust, adversarial advocacy, but also procedures to promote fairness, and rules to deter and to punish
cheating. Second, in a civil case, the very existence of the underlying duty,
as well as the fact of the alleged breach, is likely to be in issue, broadening
the scope of admissible evidence and legal argument. Third, the parties
themselves will likely disagree on how to define the scope of the dispute,
therefore potentially contesting the very boundaries of the territory they are
asking the courts to explore and to demarcate.
Even the most straightforward negligence case requires courts to
confront such questions. The key witness lives across the state line: how
will his testimony at trial be compelled? The defendant is declining to respond to certain discovery requests: should we defer scheduled trial dates to
decide whether her reasons are defensible? The plaintiff insists that his
damages are exacerbated because he had a pre-existing health condition, but
the medical records are ambiguous and the doctor who created them is unavailable: do we proceed without this evidence?
Sorting out rights that private citizens have—or claim to have—
against one another is by its nature an inefficient, frustrating, but at the same
time necessary, function of the courts. Over the years, of course, both the
73

David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1674–76
(2007).
74
Id.

File: Schneebaum 2

2011]

Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM

HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

199

legislative and the judicial branches of our government have adopted means
of containing that inefficiency. Courts may dismiss civil actions when the
party assigned the burden of proof cannot or will not show a prima facie
case.75 The party bearing that burden is given to understand, in the litigation
process, that its ability to do so is determinative of the outcome, whatever
may be the truth of the underlying allegations.
Litigation concerning facts arising elsewhere than the locale of the
courthouse may suffer from inefficiency increased in quantity, but not in
quality. Since time immemorial, it has been a feature of the common law
that an individual defendant may be sued in a private cause of action wherever he can be found, and where he has a “presence” as that term may be
defined by individual legal or constitutional systems.76 Indeed, in his landmark decision for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filartiga, Judge
Irving Kaufman cited a 1774 decision of Lord Mansfield, in which the English High Court found “not a color of doubt but that any action that is transitory may be laid in any county in England, though the matter arises beyond
the seas.”77 This has to be the case if the power of the courts to enforce private rights is not to be rendered illusory whenever the defendant adopts the
simple expedient of decamping to another jurisdiction.
Our judicial branch has developed an entire toolkit for determining
when it is simply without the ability to perform its fact-finding function
with respect to a case which it otherwise would have the power to adjudicate. One such device is the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which permits courts to refrain from proceeding in certain cases on the grounds that
they are thoroughly foreign and unconnected to the forum.78 Such is our
commitment to keeping the courthouse doors open to individuals who claim
violations of their rights, however, that application of the doctrine depends
on the defendant’s ability to show not only the inefficiency of proceeding in
the court chosen by the plaintiff, but the availability of an alternative location capable and competent to do justice.79 If the remedy offered by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is in reality
no remedy at all, the court must proceed to decide the case before it no mat75
George Nils Herlitz, The Meaning of the Term “Prima Facie,” 55 LA. L. REV. 391,
394–95 (1994) (discussing the English and American roots of the prima facie case).
76
James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implication for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 230–35 (2004) (describing the different
standards for personal jurisdiction in state and federal courts).
77
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 855.
78
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1981) (holding that the
forum non conveniens doctrine is designed to help courts avoid being mired in issues of
comparative law and to disincentivize foreign plaintiffs from bringing suit in U.S. courts
merely to seek more favorable civil litigation outcomes).
79
Id. at 248–49.

File: Schneebaum 2

Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM

200

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:183

ter how inconvenient it might be to do so (although of course, in these as in
virtually all civil matters it is still the plaintiff’s burden to prove prima facie
entitlement to relief).80
It is not an accident or a coincidence that U.S. courts have only very
rarely entertained motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds in
human rights litigation. The reason is that the states in which these cases
arise, and whose officials stand accused of violations of basic human rights,
are also characteristically unable to provide mechanisms in which the government and its agents can be held liable for their failure to abide by their
commitments, whether deriving from treaty, custom, general principles, or
any other source of law.
Plaintiffs such as those in Lumintang, in other words, have nowhere
else to go. As their actions sound in tort, and they are seeking to vindicate
private and not public rights, if they can find those accused in the United
States, subject to the personal jurisdiction of our courts, they may rely on
the ancient notion of transitory torts to file suit here, and to have their cases
heard in our courts.81
International law is part of the law of this nation, and when the requirements of international law are “specific, universal, and obligatory,”
and the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction here, there is no analytical difference between a case alleging torture in Paraguay by this defendant
in violation of binding norms of both domestic and international jurisprudence, and others in which it is contended that the defendant breached a
contract in Switzerland, or that he caused a traffic accident in Canada. None
of these by its nature requires the courts to exceed the province assigned to
them by our Constitution. In none are considerations of inefficiency allowed
to displace the courts’ constitutional mandate. All are consistent with this
nation’s adherence to its tradition of providing a safe place where a neutral
judge or jury will evaluate the evidence and apply the law.
IV.
Whether judicial resources should be spent on human rights cases
arising overseas is, of course, ultimately a matter for legislatures to address.
But the change in the law demanded by those who would close the courthouse doors to such disputes would be radical. For one thing, there has never been a bar to bringing human rights abuse cases in state courts of general
jurisdiction, which do not require the ATS to pave the way. In those courts,
plaintiffs like the Filartigas, or the alleged victims of torture or forced dis-

80
81

Id. at 254–55.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 29 (2011).
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appearances in Haiti,82 could simply plead their cases, casting onto their
defendants the challenge of attempting to justify human rights abuses in the
face of the requirements of international and municipal law.
What is the logic that would exclude this category of cases from
federal judicial cognizance? The assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction
over such disputes is not imperialistic, nor does it require the courts to ascertain and to apply a body of jurisprudence that is indeterminate or inchoate. And while there is an element of inefficiency in attempting to perform
fact-finding in Washington, D.C., regarding a massacre in Timor-Leste, it is
not substantially different from trying to ascertain the facts of what happened in a corporate boardroom across town, or in the mind of a mother
who absconds with her child in violation of a custody order. Fact-finding is
always a frustrating process, for many reasons, some practical, and some
built into the system itself. But if judges maintain courtroom discipline and
enforce the rules—especially those relating to burdens of proof—those frustrations can be overcome and decisions can be made with relative confidence.
We live in a world in which virtually every aspect of the law—from
contracts to environmental regulation, from taxation to family law—now
bears international implications. The World Wide Web, by virtue simply of
being worldwide, reminds us daily that the law and its subjects can no longer be contained neatly within national borders. In light of these developments, it would be irresponsible in the extreme for policy-makers now to
move in the opposite direction.
That such a move would be irresponsible, however, does not mean
that it would not be popular. In 2010, 70% of the voters in the State of Oklahoma voted to adopt an amendment to their Constitution, which reads in
relevant part as follows:
The Courts provided for [elsewhere in the Constitution], when exercising
their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in
the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established
common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant
thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other na-

82

Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005). In Jean, as in a number of other
ATS cases, including the ones against former President Marcos, the plaintiffs actually collected a substantial monetary judgment. Id.
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tions or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international
or Sharia Law.83

While it is easy to write off this effort as jingoistic or simply ignorant, it evidences a popular sentiment that may not be ignored. Within the
last decade, the previous Administration in Washington attempted not only
in such human rights litigation as Sosa, but more broadly in its effort to justify its own violations of international law, to persuade the courts that the
international legal regime is not really law, and is not binding on the United
States. These efforts were thwarted at every turn, albeit sometimes by a
sharply-divided Supreme Court.
That these attempts have not abated provides, in my view, reason to
agree that the title of this conference, “International Law in Crisis,” is no
panicked exaggeration. The crisis will require that those of us who are confident in the vitality and the necessity of international law—to guard, as
domestic law does in its sphere, against the abuse of power—make sure that
its roots in the U.S. legal system continue to be protected and respected.
This will not be easy, but one is encouraged by the calm, professional, and
deeply conservative approaches U.S. district court judges have taken toward
ATS litigation brought before them, especially since Sosa. In these cases, as
in all the cases they must decide every day, courts review the caselaw of
precedential value, and apply time-honored and traditional methods for determining whether they have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person of the defendant, and whether the plaintiff is able to muster sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact might conclude that she is
entitled to a remedy.
Following this process is how our courts have functioned properly,
according to the standards laid out in our Constitution, and that is how they
should always function. Human rights litigation is of a piece with lawsuits
brought since the founding of our country, and in England before that, in
which individuals have sought to protect themselves against violations of
their legal rights. It is the defenders of these traditions, not those who would
uproot them, overturning centuries of tradition, who are the conservatives.
83
H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. State Question 755 (Okla. 2010). The “Save Our
State Amendment” was presented to Oklahoma voters as State Question 755, and after they
approved it was immediately held by a federal court to be unconstitutional. Awad v. Ziriax,
754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. 2012). No
serious constitutional law scholar would be willing to defend such a law, and efforts to revise
it to avoid problems of facial unconstitutionality have so far been stymied in the State Legislature. But similar efforts have been mounted in other states, and legislation has been introduced in the last several U.S. Congresses to restrict the freedom of judges to apply, or even
to reference, international law in deciding cases before them. See Aaron Fellmeth, International and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May
26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110526.pdf.
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To the question asked by a hypothetical judge about an ATS complaint—“What is this case doing here?”—then, the answer is this:
“Your Honor, federal jurisdiction here is guaranteed according to a
statute as old as the Republic. The defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Court, and the plaintiff alleges the violation of rights arising under international law, which is and has always been part of the law of our land. The
case now awaits your decision, which must be rendered in keeping with the
oath of office you took upon your commissioning, to ‘administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, . . .
faithfully and impartially [to] discharge and perform all the duties upon
[you] as a federal judge under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.’ So help you God.”84
That should be a satisfactory answer for any judge. And it should
remind all of us that international law is law, providing inter alia for the
rights of individuals wherever they may be located, simply by virtue of our
common humanity.85
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28 U.S.C. § 453 (2011) (laying out the official language for the federal judicial oath).
The case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was argued before the United States Supreme Court on February 28, 2012. The issue presented concerned whether federal courts
may obtain jurisdiction over corporations in ATS cases, on the grounds that they may validly
be accused of having committed the “violations of the law of nations” that constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite under the statute. A week later, the Court sua sponte restored the Kiobel case to its docket for reargument, on the broader question of “[w]hether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, 80 U.S.L.W. 3506
(Mar. 5, 2012). In other words, the Supreme Court has invited briefing and argument on
precisely the question raised in this essay: “What is this case doing here?”
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